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Biomedical research is becoming increasingly large-scale and international. Cloud computing enables the
comprehensive integration of genomic and clinical data, and the global sharing and collaborative processing of
these data within a flexibly scalable infrastructure. Clouds offer novel research opportunities in genomics, as they
facilitate cohort studies to be carried out at unprecedented scale, and they enable computer processing with
superior pace and throughput, allowing researchers to address questions that could not be addressed by studies
using limited cohorts. A well-developed example of such research is the Pan-Cancer Analysis of Whole Genomes
project, which involves the analysis of petabyte-scale genomic datasets from research centers in different locations
or countries and different jurisdictions. Aside from the tremendous opportunities, there are also concerns regarding
the utilization of clouds; these concerns pertain to perceived limitations in data security and protection, and the
need for due consideration of the rights of patient donors and research participants. Furthermore, the increased
outsourcing of information technology impedes the ability of researchers to act within the realm of existing local
regulations owing to fundamental differences in the understanding of the right to data protection in various legal
systems. In this Opinion article, we address the current opportunities and limitations of cloud computing and
highlight the responsible use of federated and hybrid clouds that are set up between public and private partners as
an adequate solution for genetics and genomics research in Europe, and under certain conditions between Europe
and international partners. This approach could represent a sensible middle ground between fragmented individual
solutions and a “one-size-fits-all” approach.Background: challenges and current solutions for
pan-cancer translational genomics research
Recent decreases in the cost of genome sequencing have
driven forward several large-scale initiatives in basic and
translational genomics research [1–4] (see, for example,
the International Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC)
[5], the Pan-Cancer Analysis of Whole Genomes
(PCAWG) project [6], and the 100,000 Genomes Project
[7]). It is expected that hundreds of thousands of patients’
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molecular data types—such as transcriptomes, micro-
biomes (Box 1), and clinical information— the resulting
uniquely rich dataset enables integrative analyses to be
carried out at unprecedented depth and scale and facili-
tates new insights into molecular disease processes, thus
having implications for basic research and personalized
healthcare. Comparative analyses across specimens
collected by individual projects of the ICGC [2] may, for
example, help to uncover commonalities and differences
in the development and progression of different types and
subtypes of cancer [1], and may inform the development
of novel diagnostic and treatment strategies. A well-
developed example of collaborative data sharing and ana-
lysis is the PCAWG project of the ICGC [6], whichle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
ro/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Box 1 Definitions and explanations of legal and computing terms
Application programming interface: a set of definitions, protocols, tools, and clearly defined methods of communication between
different software components.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: a group that was set up in Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive, the data protection
regulation of the EU previous to the GDPR. Its membership consisted of the national supervisory authorities of the European Union (EU),
the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Commission (EC). It will be replaced, according to the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), by the European Data Protection Board, which will have a similar membership. Compared to the Article 29
Working Party, which was an advisory body, the European Data Protection Board will have an enhanced status as an independent body
of the EU with its own legal personality. See [43] for more information.
Binding corporate rules: personal data protection policies that are adhered to by a controller or processor established in the territory
of a member state. They regulate transfers or a set of transfers of personal data to a controller or processor in one or more third
countries within a group of undertakings, or such transfers within a group of enterprises that are engaged in a joint economic activity
(Article 4(20) of [14]).
Cloud computing: the storing and large-scale processing of data by multiple users by means of a shared information technology infra-
structure in which resources can be requested and released on demand, and by using a remote access connection that is usually established
via the Internet (or via a private network in exceptional cases).
Consent: any freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous indication of a data subject’s wishes; this involves the subject
providing a statement or a clear affirmative action that signifies their agreement to the processing of their personal data (Article
4(11) of [14]).
The Court of Justice of the European Union: the principal judicial institution of the EU. It currently consists of one judge from each
member state and eight advocates general. Its function is to ensure the observance of the law. The EC, or another member state, may bring
an action before the Court of Justice against a member state on the grounds of a failure to fulfill an obligation under the EU treaties. The
European Court of Justice is part of The Court of Justice of the European Union. It is the highest court in the European Union. See [44] for
more information.
Data controller: a natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body that—alone or jointly with others—determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data (Article 4 (7) of [14]).
Data processor: a natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body that processes personal data on behalf of the data
controller (Article 4(8) of [14]).
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a human rights catalogue that is legally binding across the EU. It consists of a preamble, 50 articles
with individual guarantees, and four articles with general provisions. It serves as a reference document for the fundamental rights that
are protected in the EU. See [32] for more information.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): an independent judicial body set up within the Council of Europe and established
under the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ECtHR is composed of a
number of judges that is equal to the number of contracting parties of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; currently 47).
The ECHR gives the ECtHR both contentious and advisory jurisdiction. See [45] for more information.
EU treaties: binding agreements approved voluntarily and democratically by all EU member countries. They set out EU objectives, rules
for EU institutions, how decisions are made, and the relationship between the EU and its member countries. Under the treaties, EU
institutions can adopt legislation that the member countries then implement. The treaties established in the EU are the main source of
EU primary law. Secondary sources are legal instruments that are based on the treaties such as unilateral secondary law. See [46, 47] for
more information.
EU–US Privacy Shield: the EU–US Privacy Shield frameworks were designed by the United States (US) Department of Commerce and
the EC to provide companies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean with a mechanism that allows compliance with data protection
requirements when transferring personal data from the EU and Switzerland to the US in support of transatlantic commerce. See [48] for
more information.
Federated clouds: setups that involve the deployment of multiple public and/or private cloud resources that are made consistently
accessible through the use of joint interoperable protocols, typically to match specific needs (for example, to enable data processors to
access otherwise inaccessible data sets).
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Hybrid clouds: cloud computing setups that encompass a combination of on-premises (private) and third-party (public) cloud services.
Interoperability: the ability of a computer system to run programs from different vendors, and to interact with other computers
regardless of the architecture and operating systems used. See [49] for more information.
Jurisdiction: the authority of a court or other institution to make decisions or judgments.
Microbiome: the community of microorganisms (for example, bacteria, fungi, and viruses) that inhabit a particular environment, and
particularly the collection of microorganisms that live in or on the human body.
Personal data: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. An identifiable natural person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data
or an online identifier, or by reference to one or more factors specific to their physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic,
cultural, or social identity (Article 4(1) of [14]).
Petabyte (PB): a multiple of the unit byte, which is used in the quantification of digital information. 1 PB = 1015 bytes.
Pseudonymization: the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific
data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to
technical and organizational measures that ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person
(Article 4(5) of [14]).
Safe Harbor Agreement: the EU Data Protection Directive prohibited the transfer of personal data to non-EU countries that do not
meet the EU “adequacy” standard for privacy protection. In order to bridge differences in data protection approaches and provide a
streamlined means for US organizations to comply with the Directive, the US Department of Commerce—in consultation with the EC—de-
veloped a Safe Harbor framework to provide the information an organization would need to evaluate and then join the US–EU Safe Harbor
program. On 6 October 2015, the European Court of Justice issued a judgment declaring as invalid the EC’s Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July
2000 “on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by
the US Department of Commerce”. See [50] for more information.
Scalability: the capability of a computer system or process to handle an increasing amount of work or its potential to be enlarged to
accommodate such growth.
Standard contract clauses: the EC may set standard contractual clauses for the governance of data processing by a processor under
EU or member state law. These clauses are binding on the processor with regard to the controller and set out—among other
aspects—the subject matter and duration of the processing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the type of personal data and
categories of data subjects, and the obligations and rights of the controller. These clauses are subject to a specific examination
procedure according to Article 93(2) and Article 28(7) of [14].
Third party: a natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or body other than the data subject, controller, processor, and persons who,
under the direct authority of the controller or processor, are authorized to process personal data (Article 4(10) of [14]).
Use case: a specific application—for example, the analysis of human genomes with an intended useful scientific outcome—performed
by cloud users (in this case scientists).
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been collected across research centers from different legal
systems and jurisdictions (that is, the different territories
or areas of activity over which the legal authority of a
court or other institution extends). In this article, we refer
to this project as an example “use case” (Box 1) of large-
scale data integration involving genomic data from differ-
ent international cohorts.
Along with these data integration opportunities, novel
challenges are emerging in relation to data processing
and sharing, for example. Most individual academic
research centers do not currently possess the informa-
tion technology (IT) infrastructure required to securely
store and jointly process thousands of whole-genome
sequences and similar quantities of other data.Furthermore, differences in analytical methods and their
lack of standardization mean that the results of genetic
and genomic analyses from different research locations
are often incomparable, which impedes data re-use and
reduces the benefits for research and patients.
Cloud computing (Box 1) could help to overcome
many of these difficulties by allowing the rapid sharing
and standardized processing of research data in a collab-
orative manner (Box 2) [9]. However, efforts to compara-
tively analyze genomic data—for example, those from
different types of cancer—have revealed further chal-
lenges related to the secure cloud-based large-scale pro-
cessing and collaborative sharing and storage of research
data across cohorts [1]. The goal of the PCAWG project is
to identify common patterns of mutation in whole-genome
Box 2 Advantages and disadvantages of cloud
computing
Advantages
+ Acceleration of computing processes
+ Rapid scalability upward and downward, commensurate with
demand
+ Widespread network access
+ High security safeguards: standardized data security measures
allow vast quantities of data to be processed under the same
safeguards
+ Reduction of infrastructural and operational costs through
resource sharing
Disadvantages
Tailoring of cloud service contracts to organization-specific legal
or service-level requirements can be difficult
Difficulties in localizing data (some public clouds)
Difficulties in assigning responsibilities between data controllers
and data processors
Difficulties in setting common standards of data protection if
data can be accessed from different places (that is, different
jurisdictions)
Difficulties in comparing cloud service levels or performance (for
example, during procurement)
Migration of information technology services and data access
into the cloud requires the involvement of teams possessing a
specific skill set
Technological differences between cloud providers can create
challenges for cross-cloud integration or migration between
providers (vendor lock-in)
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tissues from >2800 patients with cancer; this project will
generate nearly 1 petabyte of data.
To meet the challenges associated with pursuing research
with such large-scale data, a model of collaborative and dis-
tributed computing has been developed within the
PCAWG consortium [1], and it involves different partner
institutions that contribute computing centers that have lo-
calized institutional clouds as well as public cloud comput-
ing capabilities. The involvement of academic partners
based in countries outside of Europe (which are hereafter
referred to as third countries) and of commercial partners
could facilitate the compilation of large and diverse datasets
through research collaboration, and could add expertise,
technical capabilities, and data-processing capacity. Ana-
lyses during the initial stages of the PCAWG project—of
data from ~1000 patients with cancer—were conducted in
part on commercial clouds at a relatively low price and
under advantageous processing conditions (that is, for ex-
ample, in terms of speed and data-processing capacity).The quantity and diversity of patient data processed
on clouds are increasing in cross-border genomic data-
sharing projects. Although not all of the data (including
genetic and genomic data) collected have an unambigu-
ous connection to a particular individual, the probability
of being able to identify a pseudonymized (Box 1) or
anonymized sample donor—whether unintentionally or
intentionally—is increasing as data quantity and data
diversity increase. As an example, in the context of dis-
ease studies, information about disease diagnosis and
the ethnicity and age of a patient may already be suffi-
cient for the identification of donors in a number of
cases. If the data are stored on public clouds, segregation
between different data categories may thus become
necessary. However, rules and regulations for data shar-
ing and redistribution differ between data types and
sometimes between jurisdictions, which prevents the
development of a uniform solution for data sharing that
fits all use cases in genetics and genomics research.
Various global approaches to data protection, and par-
ticularly to the understanding and regulation of the right
to the protection of personal data (Box 1), can be identi-
fied as a significant barrier to cross-border genetics
research. In this article, we first describe how cloud
computing is used for genetics and genomics research in
different countries and international projects. Second,
we focus on the specific challenges arising from current
regulatory solutions for processing European patient
datasets, particularly regarding the responsibilities of
persons and entities that control data processing (data
controllers; Box 1) and those that accomplish processing
on their behalf (data processors; Box 1), and for transfers
to third countries. Third, we consider possible ways in
which international regulatory differences in data protec-
tion could be overcome in order to ensure that individual
rights and freedoms are maintained while enabling genet-
ics and genomics research and collaboration with global
partners and facilitating the freedom of scientific research.
Finally, we discuss possible technological solutions that
could overcome the identified regulatory challenges.
Global cloud computing of patient data for
genetics and genomics research
Cloud computing is used for two main reasons in genetics
and genomics research: first, to allow large-scale genomic
data processing using readily scalable, external infrastruc-
ture; and second, to allow the sharing of genomic data
with collaborators via a jointly usable IT environment. In
the United States (US), for example, the National Institutes
of Health is promoting the deposition of research data on
diverse cloud platforms, including commercial clouds, to
facilitate data sharing [10]. Within Europe, the European
Open Science Cloud (EOSC) pilot project and related
studies (for example, the German de.NBI cloud project,
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public and public–private cloud frameworks to promote
research based on shared datasets [11].
Diverse approaches for using clouds in research result
in additional challenges in terms of the interoperability
(Box 1) of the analytical frameworks being used. The
analysis of data from global cohorts requires that
researchers either copy all of the data to a common loca-
tion or develop tools that are able to operate in a glo-
bally distributed manner; the development of such tools
represents a significant technical challenge, as
researchers use different application programming inter-
faces (APIs; Box 1). This has resulted in the develop-
ment of novel scientific data analysis frameworks—such
as Butler [12]—that are able to operate across the gamut
of globally dispersed cloud computing environments to
deliver analysis results in a timely manner. An additional
major challenge stems from jurisdictional differences in
legislation, as well as differences in donor consent (Box 1),
which may permit, limit, or prevent the distribution of
genetics and genomics research data with clouds, thus
leading to diversification in the use of clouds between
countries and to the establishment of jurisdiction-based
cloud silos. Restricting the geographic locality of data
stored in the cloud to specific jurisdictions is currently
not standardized, and typically involves the selection of
cloud providers that are able to offer services from data
centers in a particular country or region, and involves
appropriate contractual arrangements. To support the
efficient exchange and distribution of genetic and
genomic data across clouds and jurisdictions, future re-
search will need to focus on standardizing cloud pro-
curement (that is, obtaining or buying cloud services from
an external provider) and on determining the technical ele-
ments involved in developing a common approach to pro-
tect cloud data locality (often referred to as “geo-fencing”).
In the European Union (EU) and US, for example,
there are differences in the regulation of data protec-
tion. Personal data protection aims to protect the
participants of genetics and genomics research and
uphold their rights and freedoms, which could be
compromised depending on the use of their data
(Recital 1 of [13]). The EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which came into force in 2016,
aims to secure a high level of protection of personal
data in all member states [14]. It is applicable to a
broad range of personal data-processing activities and
grants individuals with various rights in relation to
numerous data categories. It provides a general and
uniform protection as public and private addressees
of this regulation generally fall under the same legis-
lation [15].
In the US, aspects relating to the protection of the
right to data protection have been derived from theFourth Amendment of the Constitution, which protects
individuals against “unreasonable searches and seizures”
[16]. The application of this Amendment is limited to
those “places, things and actions” in relation to which an
individual has a “legitimate expectation of privacy”, and
thus excludes data that individuals voluntarily provide to
third parties (page 362 of [17]; Box 1) such as personal
data that have been provided for research and for which
informed consent has been obtained. The constitutional
validity of a search or seizure in the case of foreign
intelligence surveillance for national security purposes
was formally recognized in 2008 [18]. In addition, the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to foreign citizens or
residents [19]. In contrast to the EU, there is no horizon-
tal data protection legislation in the US that is applicable
to both public and private addressees. By limiting gov-
ernmental action only, data protection in the US is
mainly understood as informational seclusion and a right
to be left alone (Recital 31 of [13]), rather than the
effective preservation and promotion of an individual’s
capacity to make free decisions about their data.
Despite these principal differences between the EU
and the US in the understanding of data protection, recent
changes in regulation suggest certain moves toward
harmonization. Some courts in the US have recently
begun to scrutinize the broad exemption of voluntary
transfer (for example, that of individual data) in light of
the changing electronic and technological landscape (page
22 of [20]). In addition, the Fourth Amendment has
recently been applied in a judgment that has been inter-
preted as creating a “right to deletion” of outdated data
held by law enforcement agencies (page 140 of [21]). In
parallel to this, in other countries where data protection is
not historically rooted in constitutional or common law
(for example, Australia, India, China, and Singapore),
comprehensive statutory protection is now emerging. This
international trend may hence ultimately allow for the
introduction of data protection regulation with a greater
emphasis on the active control of data by research partici-
pants. The move toward more comprehensive global data
protection could benefit international data-sharing and
multicenter research projects such as the PCAWG project.
Processing European patient data: challenges due
to current regulatory solutions
Due to this cautious worldwide trend toward attributing
more rights to data subjects (that is, to the individuals
who provide personal data), we will now focus on the
EU regulations that are relevant in the context of the
PCAWG project, which we use as an example of a pro-
ject in which research participants and patient donors
are encouraged to have an active role in data protection.
The GDPR of the EU will apply in the member states
from 25 May 2018 [14]. Although the GDPR leaves
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consideration of the general standards defined in the
GDPR is crucial for the evaluation of cloud models that
could be used in common European genetics and gen-
omics research. With this in mind, the GDPR has also
the declared objective of facilitating the free flow of data
in the European Digital Single Market (Recital 170 of
[14]). As differing regulations for data processing
between member states could limit the free flow of data,
the GDPR claims that it harmonizes, to a high degree,
both the rights of the persons affected and the obliga-
tions of data controllers and data processors. At the
same time, it also stipulates that the persons affected
should be able to retain control over their data regard-
less of technological developments ([8] and Recital 15 of
[14]) and that the level of data protection must ultimately
remain high regardless of the processing technology
employed (Recital 10 of [14]).
Processing personal data in principle
The GDPR defines the sphere of personal data. The def-
inition is broad and includes even pseudonymized data
that can be attributed to an individual (known legally as
a “natural person”) by drawing on additional information
([22] and Article 4(1) of [14]). For the purposes of scien-
tific research, it is possible—under certain circumstan-
ces—to make an exception to the ban on processing
sensitive data, such as genetic and medical data (Recital
10, Article 9(1) and Article 9(2)i of [14]). Furthermore,
the GDPR requires that confidentiality is ensured on an
ongoing basis in the processing of personal data (this is
termed “ongoing confidentiality”; Article 32(1)b of [14]).
In addition to genetic and clinical data, genetic studies
have begun to collect other data, such as information
about lifestyle (for example, cigarette consumption), and
an increasing quantity and diversity of phenotypic data,
thus increasing the identifiability of donors.
In this regard, the so-called “right to be forgotten” is
codified in the GDPR (Recital 65 and Article 17 of [14]).
As part of this right, the deletion of data and the forgo-
ing of any further processing could be required under
certain circumstances, such as when consent has been
withdrawn. The further storage of personal data is none-
theless considered legal if, among other reasons, this is
necessary for the purpose of scientific research. A neces-
sity exists if the exercising of the right makes achieving
the goals of the scientific research impossible or would
seriously impair the research (Article 17(3)d of [14]).
However, if storage is no longer required for the purpose
of scientific research, personal data must be deleted
without unreasonable delay following requests made by
donors (Article 17(1)a of [14]).
Research relevant to genomic medicine often seeks
participation from a large number of patients, and inmost instances, the withdrawal of consent by individual
patients does not have a substantial influence on the
research. However, the more pressing unanswered tech-
nical question is how the right to be forgotten can be
enforced when data are processed in a public cloud. The
localization of individual datasets in global public clouds
can give rise to difficulties because of the distributed na-
ture of the data centers of these cloud providers and the
likelihood that copies of datasets exist.
The PCAWG consortium has begun collaborating with
commercial cloud providers to leverage their enormous
computing capacities for the processing of properly con-
sented datasets [12]. However, the use of IT resources
from commercial cloud providers, for example, could give
rise to additional data processing challenges regarding the
responsibilities of the data controller and the data proces-
sor and the transfer of personal data to third countries; we
discuss these challenges below.The responsibility of the data controller and the data
processor
In the GDPR, the comprehensive responsibility and
accountability of the persons and entities that control data
processing are codified for their own processing of per-
sonal data and for the processing that is accomplished on
their behalf by, for instance, cloud service subproviders
(Chapter IV of [14]). The data controllers not only have to
take technical and organizational measures in order to be
able to prove adherence with the data protection provi-
sions (Article 25(2) of [14]), but also have to take appro-
priate and effective measures that take into account the
nature, scope, context, and purposes of the processing, as
well as the risk of compromising the personal rights and
freedoms of the persons affected (Article 24(1) of [14]).
They must only employ means of data processing that
ensure sufficient guarantees for the protection of personal
data (Recital 81 and Article 28 of [14]). The controller is
responsible for the implementation of all principles of data
processing (Article 5(2) of [14]) and, in particular, has the
duty of enforcing the rights of affected persons, inclu-
ding—first and foremost—the obligations of conveying
information to the affected persons (information obliga-
tions) (Article 14 of [14]) and the duty to take appropriate
steps to inform further responsible parties of a request for
deletion by an affected person (Article 17(2)a, Recital 86
and Article 33 of [14]).
Data processors also have certain obligations. Among
other duties, they must provide all necessary information
for proving the fulfillment of their obligations to the data
controllers in order to demonstrate that they are operat-
ing in accordance with the GDPR. Furthermore, they
should make it possible for controllers to conduct in-
spections (Article 28(3)h of [14]). They are also obliged
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controller (Article 28(3)g of [14]).
However, it is often unclear whether it is the data con-
troller or the data processor who is responsible for the
actual implementation of the data processing require-
ments and guarantees that are applicable according to
the GDPR (Articles 31 and 32 of [14]). It is important to
note that in the context of genomics studies such as the
PCAWG project, commercial cloud providers might
cooperate with subproviders without fully revealing the
circumstances of their cooperation to data controllers.
In such cases, it is possible that the main cloud service
provider would itself act as a data controller in the rela-
tionship with the subprovider, thus further complicating
the clarification of responsibilities.
While the distinction between these responsibilities
has some advantages for data controllers, these provi-
sions still take little account of the different relationships
that exist between the persons and entities that decide
how data should be processed and those who solely
carry out data processing on behalf of the controllers,
depending on the different partners involved in the
cooperation (that is, academic, private, or public cloud
providers). If, for example, European researchers acting
as data controllers use the cloud services of globally
acting commercial cloud providers, it is hardly (if at all)
possible for them to fulfill their duties to ensure and
monitor data protection standards. Such difficulties in
fulfilling these obligations are even more likely to arise
in intercontinental collaborations such as the PCAWG
project. In the GDPR, both the data controller and the
data processor are obliged to make use of solutions to
allow the affected person to continue to have the funda-
mental rights and guarantees that they have in the EU
(Recital 114 and Chapter V of [14]). Ongoing growth in
the outsourcing of IT infrastructures is making it sub-
stantially more difficult for the researchers involved to
track and verify global data-processing procedures. Even
though researchers may have the best intentions, fulfilling
this expectation poses a great challenge to all those involved
in research, given the fundamental differences in the under-
standing and regulation of personal data protection and the
rights of persons affected at an international level [13].
The transfer of personal data to third countries
The GDPR has strict requirements regarding the transfer
of personal data to third countries. No specific exception
for the transfer of personal data to a third country in the
area of scientific research—such as within the context of
genomic research consortia like PCAWG—is provided
for. In the third country, an adequate level of protection
is necessary (Recital 81 and Article 45(1) of [14]). The
objective of this requirement is to maintain the protection
of the individual as guaranteed by the GDPR, even if theindividual’s data are transferred repeatedly (Recital 104 of
[14]). In its ruling of 6 October 2015, the European Court
of Justice (ECJ; Box 1) declared invalid the decision of the
European Commission (EC) that, based on the Safe
Harbor Agreement (Box 1) between the US and the EU,
the US ensured an adequate level of protection [23, 24].
The ECJ found that the Safe Harbor Agreement does not
contain any provision regarding the existence of rules in
the US that have been adopted by federal authorities and
that intend to limit any interference with the fundamental
rights of persons whose data are transferred from the EU
to the US. Such interference can be relevant when, for
example, state bodies of the US are authorized to access
data for legitimate objectives, such as national security.
Moreover, the Safe Harbor Agreement does not refer to
the existence of effective legal protection against interfer-
ence of this kind.
In light of the ECJ judgment, the permissibility of data
transfer to the US on the basis of other binding agree-
ments or legal instruments, such as binding corporate
rules or standard contract clauses (Box 1), has also been
called into question [25]. At the beginning of 2016, the EC
announced the completion of negotiations with the US
over a new data transfer mechanism named the EU–US
Privacy Shield [26] (Box 1). After obtaining advice from
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (an EU ad-
visory body; Box 1) and representatives of the member
states, the results of the negotiations were considered to
provide a new basis for an “adequacy resolution” by the
EC that acknowledges the existence of adequate data pro-
tection in the US as a third country. However, the new
guidelines have been sharply criticized by data protection
experts [27]. An Irish privacy advocacy group (Digital
Rights Ireland) has already presented the ECJ with criti-
cisms about the EU–US Privacy Shield; it questioned the
adequacy of the EU–US Privacy Shield agreement and ar-
gued that it did not sufficiently address the court’s objec-
tions to the Safe Harbor Agreement [28]. This emerging
criticism calls into question whether there will be constant
and legally valid grounds for transatlantic transfers of gen-
etic and genomic research data in the form of an inter-
national agreement in the near future.
In the absence of an adequacy decision by the EC, and
without sufficient guarantees by means of standard con-
tract clauses or binding corporate regulations, the gen-
eral derogations (that is, the partial exemptions from the
general rules) provided by the GDPR to limit the rights
of data subjects in favor of the freedom of research
could be drawn on for the benefit of the freedom of
research (Recitals 107 and 108 of [14]). Derogations that
might possibly be used to facilitate the freedom of
research in the fields of genetics and genomics include
those relating to the explicit consent of the data subject
and the vital interests of the data subject if they are
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icle 49(1)f of [14]). If derogations cannot be made use of,
then transfers that are not considered large-scale—that
is, those that do not occur repeatedly and only affect a
limited number of persons— may also be possible in the
event of compelling legitimate interests of the data con-
troller (Recital 113 and Article 49(1)g of [14]). The pro-
cessing of personal data is considered to be large-scale if
a large number of data subjects are affected and if the
processing would probably constitute a large risk owing,
for example, to the sensitivity of the data being processed.
The processing is thus also considered to be large-scale if
a new technology is extensively used or the technologies
used entail a high risk of compromising the rights and
freedoms of the persons affected or if their use hinders the
enforcement of those rights (Recital 91 of [14]).
It is questionable whether or not the decisive derogation
of informed consent could be used in cross-border genetics
and genomics research collaborations [29, 30]. A patient’s
consent, even if obtained in a dynamic manner, can only
confirm their understanding of the scope of data transfer-
ability in a very limited way. Also, without knowledge about
the specific analysis results of the research, it is often not
possible to prove that the vital interest of the person con-
cerned will be affected by the analysis. According to the
ECJ’s Safe Harbor Agreement ruling, consent for the trans-
fer of personal data can only form a sound basis for data
transfer under the narrow conditions of the transfer not oc-
curring repeatedly, in large quantities, or routinely [31].
Cloud computing in genetics and genomics research may
mean that a large quantity of diverse data (including sensi-
tive data) from many thousands of patients is processed at
high rates using new IT resources, which would make lo-
cating the data and thus the availability of the data for ap-
propriate control and processing more difficult.
The way forward: addressing regulatory
difficulties
We now discuss possible solutions that could overcome
regulatory difficulties in order to facilitate the promotion of
scientific research and to protect the rights of data subjects.
Again, we use the PCAWG project as an example of a genet-
ics and genomics research project that involves patient data,
uses cloud computing, and operates within the realm of EU
law. We first consider the status and rights of scientific re-
searchers in the EU in relation to the EU’s aim to promote
the European Research Area. Second, we weigh up technical
solutions that might be employed to protect and fulfill the
fundamental rights of the data subjects and the researchers.
Scientific freedom and the promotion of science under
EU law
The specific standardization of scientific freedom as a
fundamental EU right in the EU Charter of FundamentalRights (EUCFR; Box 1) can be understood as an EU
position for setting values that must also be taken into
account when interpreting fundamental rights, given that
the freedom of research cannot be determined with such
clarity in the shared constitutional traditions of the
member states or the guarantees of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. The guarantee of the freedom of
research should be interpreted broadly, and it is not to be
limited except if it violates human dignity or is not
compatible with the absolute prohibitions of the EUCFR
(Article 1 and Article 3 paragraph 2 of [32]). When
considered more closely, limitations to scientific freedom
arise primarily from clashing fundamental rights in the
EUCFR, including the protection of personal data, and
also specific legal provisions that are embedded in other
EU laws and in national legislation [33].
The promotion of science is an objective of the EU
and is supported by EU treaties (Box 1). According to
the Treaty of the EU (TEU), the EU promotes scientific
and technological progress (Article 3 III cl. 2 of [34]).
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) defines
a European area of research and stipulates that the EU
has the objective of strengthening its scientific and techno-
logical bases by achieving such a European Research Area.
In this area, there should be freedom of movement for
researchers, and it should be possible for scientific know-
ledge and technologies to circulate freely. In creating this
area, the EU has the goal of developing competitiveness,
including in its industries. To this end, the entire EU must
support undertakings (such as projects or enterprises),
research centers, and universities in their research
and activities for high-quality technological develop-
ment. The EU must support their efforts to cooperate
with each other, particularly so that researchers can
cooperate freely across borders and their activities
can fully exploit internal market potential. This could
be achieved, in particular, by defining common stan-
dards and by removing legal and fiscal obstacles to
such cooperation (Article 179 of [35]).
The fundamental objective of the EU in its promotion
of research is to strengthen its scientific and technological
bases, and also to improve competitiveness in the broadest
sense, rather than just provide extensive individual free-
dom of research. The most important instrument for
achieving the promotion of research is Europe-wide net-
working by means of cooperation and coordination [36].
The fundamental right of scientific freedom is primarily a
defensive right. No entitlement to benefits for support-
ing research can be derived for the individual re-
searcher or scientific establishments from the EUCFR
(Article 13 of [32], and [37]). The right to freedom of
science guaranteed under basic EU law nonetheless also
requires that the support of research by EU institutions
should be provided in a manner that is as “suited to the
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[36]). Considering that basic and translational genetics
and genomics research is increasingly reliant on global
cooperation and, in this context, relies on high statis-
tical validity (based on comprehensive datasets), the
needs of science must also include international data
sharing and global scientific cooperation.
With regard to data protection regulation and the
interpretation of the GDPR for scientific research, the
objective of creating a European Research Area as stipu-
lated in the TFEU should be taken into account (Article
179 paragraph 1 of [35]). As the GDPR is connected to
the EU treaties as secondary law, it must be interpreted
in the light of primary law (that is, the EU treaties) in
order to be legitimate. Therefore, the requirements of
scientific research must be given a weighting similar to
that provided for in the EU treaties. In order to achieve
this objective, efforts to increase the technological con-
nectivity in Europe are indispensable. However, there
remains the question of whether such efforts are com-
patible with the eligibility conditions for translational
research projects such as the PCAWG project, which
are required to uphold protection of sensitive data
while at the same time ensuring cost-effective solutions
and international cooperation.
Federated clouds for research using sensitive data
A federated cloud setup involves the use of multiple
public and/or private cloud resources that are made con-
sistently accessible through the use of joint interoperable
protocols, typically to match specific needs (for example,
to enable data processors to access otherwise inaccessible
datasets; Box 1). Federated clouds can comprise a hybrid
cloud solution, which encompasses a combination of on-
premises (private) and third-party (public) cloud services.
This can involve the combined use of locally managed
data centers (which can store valuable, sensitive datasets
and can provide cloud computing to restricted communi-
ties) and global public cloud computing resources (which
can provide vast scalability (Box 1), commensurate with
demand, to facilitate particularly computationally inten-
sive research applications; Table 1). The advantages of
hybrid and federated cloud models are that they require
little centralized planning and can be built using different
funding sources, governance structures, and organizational
models, as long as agreement exists in terms of standards
and interoperable frameworks.
A federated cloud model could help to classify and sep-
arate personal data and additional information according
to its personal attributability and jurisdictional source.
The introduction of a corresponding differentiation in
data processing could serve to limit the possibility of
intentional or unintentional donor re-identification. Stor-
ing and processing data or data combinations attributableto persons in separated, confined (federated) clouds could
prevent the particular provider from having to disclose
data if the specific confined cloud does not fall within the
jurisdiction on which the request for disclosure is based.
By confining donor-specific data that might facilitate
re-identification to clouds under specific jurisdictions or
secure areas (even including areas outside of the cloud
for particularly sensitive patient data), the chance of
re-identification could be minimized and thus the rights
of donors could be better protected. Funders supporting
publicly financed research projects also operate on the
basis that only one copy of a dataset is saved at a single
data center for processing. This is associated not only
with security advantages, but also with savings in costs
and resources, and is thus compatible with joint process-
ing in a cloud. Such solutions are usually classified as
local data centers, although they could also be defined as
community clouds in the narrowest sense because the
participating academic institutions typically allow for
shared on-demand remote computing access to the data
in such contexts.
Merging such solutions into a confined part of a fed-
erated cloud model—on a European level, for exam-
ple—would allow for the storage of sensitive research
data in the private and community clouds of academic
institutions. Combination with a hybrid model would
simultaneously allow the involvement of recognized and
certified European industry partners to provide the neces-
sary reliable technological infrastructure, and could facili-
tate the opening up of research to global parties outside
the European Research Area. Notably, federating the com-
puting activities in different centers may thereby also
enable the involvement of third countries in international
collaborations.
Key developments in building a pan-European cloud
for science with federated and standardized access to the
cloud resources of commercial, public, and academic
providers have already been initiated in the context of the
Helix Nebula initiative [38], which is a public–private
partnership that involves several major European scientific
research centers and leading European IT service pro-
viders. The efforts of the Helix Nebula Initiative have
highlighted the importance of cloud brokerage services
and the use of interoperable and standard APIs to allow
the efficient and standardized compliant use of federated
cloud resources and hybrid clouds. Independent cloud
brokers support researchers (and institutions) in the se-
lection, purchase, and access of cloud resources. Indi-
vidual user requirements—such as the capacity, pricing,
certification, data security, interoperability, legislation,
or geographic location of data storage and processing
services—can be matched against a defined catalogue of
services offered by connected providers. Among other
advantages, standard APIs support rapid deployment,
Table 1 Benefits of cloud service provision models for storing and computing sensitive data
Commercial clouds Private, academic, and community clouds Federated hybrid clouds
Examples Amazon Web Services, Google, Microsoft,
T-Systems, Seven Bridges Genomics
The Embassy Cloud at the European
Bioinformatics Institute of the European
Molecular Biology Laboratory [51]
The public–private partnership model of
the Helix Nebula Science Cloud Initiative in
Europe [38]
Accessibility Accessible to the public Locally managed cloud resource; access is
limited to a particular community of users
Federated access to locally managed and
commercially available off-site cloud
resources through the use of joint
interoperable protocols
Benefits Provide on-demand access to competitive
large-scale data storage; have the
computational and networking resources to
scale processing; can readily store non-data
privacy critical (parts of) datasets
Provide on-demand access to well-defined
and well-managed data storage and
computing infrastructure; provide tightly
controlled data access, including to data
that cannot be transferred across the
internet
Federated model helps to differentiate
personal data attributability and limit donor
re-identification;
service brokerage supports the matching
of data and processing requirements
(for example, certification, data security,
interoperability, legislation, and geographic
location) against a defined catalogue of
services offered by connected providers
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help to address data protection and compliance issues
related, for example, to processing restricted datasets.
Furthermore, the European Cloud Initiative has been
announced as part of the EC’s Digital Single Market
agenda [39]. It is partly funded by the EC as the Initiative
will support the implementation of the future EOSC and
the complementary European Data Infrastructure. Once
established, this digital infrastructure—which is expected
to implement a federated and hybrid cloud model—should
support researchers in Europe and internationally to
securely store, process, share, and re-use data, and should
result in a trusted environment across technologies, disci-
plines, and borders.
One realization that emerged from projects such as
the PCAWG project is that while IT processing capacity
is necessary, it alone is hardly sufficient to face the emer-
ging challenges. Indeed, one major objective of the
PCAWG project and of related approaches for facilitat-
ing data sharing—such as the Global Alliance for
Genomics and Health (GA4GH) [40]—has been the
development of computational protocols that enable
interoperability and integration at the level of the soft-
ware involved: that is, the protocols and interfaces that
analysts can employ to share data and process these in a
standardized fashion across borders. A federated ecosys-
tem of sharing genomic and clinical data is now being
pushed forward by the GA4GH [41]. However, a work-
able solution must further fulfill data security and data
protection requirements, which still frequently differ
between jurisdictions, notwithstanding the fact that
there is an obvious and general movement in data pro-
tection laws toward giving data subjects an active role in
the protection of their data, as discussed above [13]. As
an example of the pan-European research infrastructure
for biological information, ELIXIR has demonstrated
that it is possible to strive for the orchestration of thecollection, quality control, archiving, and access of large
amounts of data in a manner that includes a consider-
ation of regulatory and ethical aspects [42].
Conclusions
Against the backdrop of European regulations relating to
the processing of personal data, the characteristics of
new technologies such as cloud computing in transla-
tional genetics and genomics research make their inter-
national application more difficult. In particular, the
definition of personal data, the enforcement of the
encryption principle (that is, the anonymization of per-
sonal data so that they can only be linked to patients by
authorized individuals), and the transfer of data to third
countries give rise to difficulties. There are substantial
challenges—such as the distribution of responsibilities
and obligations between data controllers and data
processors—which limit cross-border research collabora-
tions and cooperation between academic and commercial
partners, especially in the transatlantic exchange of data.
Such limitations prevent new technologies from being ap-
plied because individual researchers and research institu-
tions are often not able to fulfill the responsibility that has
been assigned to them in relation to protecting personal
data and the rights of data subjects (including patients).
International research collaborations and the involve-
ment of public partners in the research also must not, ac-
cording to the GDPR, result in weaker protection of
personal data but must instead be realized through adher-
ence to improved standards in the context of research. At
the same time, the development of scientifically and
technologically state-of-the-art data-processing technolo-
gies is a requirement for the promotion of research that is
suitable to the needs of science. Although models of feder-
ated and hybrid clouds provide clear advantages over
purely public clouds, commercial cloud computing in par-
ticular still suffers from the public perception of decreased
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transferred across a network that might be subject to
third-party interference or tapping is, for many organi-
zations, an unnecessary security risk. However, storing
sensitive patient data and combinations of data in the
context of large-scale genetics and genomics research
projects—which would only allow the identification of a
person in local academic clouds while also involving
only approved industry partners in hybrid cloud solu-
tions—might enable compliance with strict data pro-
tection regulations, and could foster trustworthy and
up-to-date international research.
Facilitating research by providing researchers with
access to data via cloud technology creates an impetus
for the development of a governance model that uses
technological solutions to comply with data protection
regulations and at the same time relies on specific stan-
dards created by professional organizations. Additionally,
if the developed cloud standards establish a framework
that enables researchers to make decisions about which
projects should use hybrid clouds and which usage
patterns are acceptable for translational research, this
framework could provide a solution for processing sensi-
tive research data in harmony with data protection regu-
lations. Independent governance that relies on the work
of professional organizations also serves to benefit the
democratization of bioinformatics research by reducing
the dependency of cutting-edge science on institutional
IT infrastructure solutions and by giving researchers
from universities and research centers equal access to
state-of-the-art IT capabilities. Clear terms of access and
excellence-driven resource allocation as part of an inde-
pendent governance would also engender the trust
necessary for the management of sensitive data in the
cloud in a context where trust is becoming a key chal-
lenge for cloud solutions. Such features would likely pro-
vide a vital competitive advantage for the European
Digital Single Market.
The accelerated expansion of European cloud solu-
tions could ensure a technological basis for researchers
to fulfill data-processing requirements. Furthermore,
trustworthy European solutions could contribute to
member states refraining from taking further measures
to restrict the transfer of sensitive data (Recital 10 of
[14]) and could also contribute to the free movement of
data within the EU without undue interference (Recitals
13, 19, and 166, and Article 1(1) of [14]). A consistent
European research infrastructure should qualify Europe
for participation in global research while also ensuring
that European data protection standards are maintained
and the rights of affected persons are guaranteed. The
EU-wide “level playing field” for data protection in the
form of federated and hybrid cloud models might enable
the development of the EOSC in a manner that alsopermits scientific collaborations with third countries on
the basis of data sharing with cloud models that follow
legal regulations and ethical standards.
To conclude, a federated and hybrid cloud model
could enable internationally established patient rights to
be respected worldwide. At the same time, the legal un-
derstanding of patient rights, the responsibilities for
their realization, and the cultural differences in their im-
plementation could still be taken into account. This
could provide the scope to allow differing implementa-
tions of subjective rights and the merging of different
cloud models into a federated and hybrid solution with-
out hindering progress toward generally increasing the
active role of research participants and patient donors in
the processing and protection of their data, thus keeping
pace with this emerging global trend.
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